Matthew Dimick, Using Legal Rules to Reduce Income Inequality by Dimick, Matthew
University at Buffalo School of Law 
Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law 
Baldy Center Blog Baldy Center 
4-26-2021 
Matthew Dimick, Using Legal Rules to Reduce Income Inequality 
Matthew Dimick 
University at Buffalo School of Law, mdimick@buffalo.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/baldy_center_blog 
Recommended Citation 
Matthew Dimick, Matthew Dimick, Using Legal Rules to Reduce Income Inequality, (2021). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/baldy_center_blog/14 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Baldy Center at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Baldy Center Blog by an authorized administrator of 
Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
Blog 14 
Matthew Dimick, Using Legal Rules to Reduce Income Inequality 
 
Blog Author: Matthew Dimick, Professor, University at Buffalo School of Law 
Introduction: The United States has experienced a disturbing expansion of income and wealth 
inequality in the past three or four decades. We only fully recognized this yawning divide in the material 
fortunes of Americans after the 2008 financial crisis, which did little to change the direction of the trend. 
The Coronavirus pandemic has only added fuel to the inequality fire in a particularly grave way. Income 
inequality might be condemned on its own terms and for its political (erosion of democracy) and 
economic (financial instability) consequences. These worrisome trends in economic inequality have 
caused scholars to look for policy solutions. For legal scholars, in particular, the question arises: can 
legal rules do anything about income inequality? A long-standing position within law-and-economics 
scholarship gives a clear answer to this question: No.  
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The United States has experienced a disturbing expansion of income and wealth inequality in the past 
three or four decades. We only fully recognized this yawning divide in the material fortunes of 
Americans after the 2008 financial crisis, which did little to change the direction of the trend. The 
Coronavirus pandemic has only added fuel to the inequality fire in a particularly grave way. Income 
inequality might be condemned on its own terms and for its political (erosion of democracy) and 
economic (financial instability) consequences. 
These worrisome trends in economic inequality have caused scholars to look for policy solutions. For 
legal scholars, in particular, the question arises: can legal rules do anything about income inequality? A 
long-standing position within law-and-economics scholarship gives a clear answer to this question: No. 
This answer finds its clearest expression in Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell’s classic 1994 article, “Why 
the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing IncomeDownload pdf.” 
In this article, Kaplow and Shavell argue that legal rules should be chosen only based on efficiency—
making the economic “pie” bigger—and never based on distribution—how the economic “pie” is 
divided. The reason for this, Kaplow and Shavell explain, is the income tax can always redistribute 
income more efficiently—that is, with less waste—than can legal rules (which they understand as all 
legal rules other than those used in the income tax system). 
For example, say we have an income tax rate on the rich of 30 percent and want to redistribute an 
additional 1 percent of income by adopting a tort rule that makes damages dependent on the 
defendant’s income. The damages a rich person will have to pay will be more than a poor person for an 
accident that otherwise causes the same harm. This rule has two effects. The effect on the income of the 
rich distorts labor-supply incentives just as a 1-percent increase in the tax rate would. But 
it also generates inefficiencies in the amount of care the rich take, which in this case spend too much 
time and resources on taking precautions against accidents. 
As Kaplow and Shavell point out, this second distortion is pure waste. Rather than adopt a tort rule that 
redistributes an additional 1 percent of income, but with additional waste, we should instead simply 
increase the income tax rate by 1 percent. This will achieve the same amount of redistribution that the 
tort-damages rule does, and because it saves on resources, those savings can be used to reduce taxes on 
everyone or increase transfer payments to the poor. The switch from the tort rule to the income tax can 
make everyone better off. Despite using this particular example, Kaplow and Shavell claim that their 
insight is quite general. Any legal rule used to redistribute income will have two negative effects—a 
“double distortion,” it has been called—whereas the income tax will only have one. 
A book that I am currently working on, The Law and Economics of Income Inequality, critically examines 
this and other arguments against using legal rules to redistribute income. One argument the book makes 
is that, while Kaplow and Shavell’s particular example may be right, their argument is not as general as 
they make it out to be. One reason for this is that using legal rules to redistribute income sometimes 
creates not two but three distortions, and this third distortion offsets rather than adds to the economic 
waste. 
As an example, consider intellectual property law. Suppose we start from an efficient IP regime and 
want to change it to address income inequality, say by reducing patent length or narrowing patent 
scope. Such a change will have two effects. Reducing the monetary rewards of holding a patent will have 
the same effects on labor supply as a tax would. It will also distort the incentives to invest in R&D and 
other inventive activities. 
So far, this tracks exactly Kaplow and Shavell’s objection. But there is a third distortion: reducing patent 
length or narrowing patent scope also increases product-market competition. More importantly, this 
distortion adds to rather than detracts from efficiency, so it moves in the opposite direction from the 
previous two distortions. Because of that offsetting effect, the new IP law can be more efficient—or, 
more accurately, less inefficient—than the income tax in redistributing income! Kaplow and Shavell’s 
argument fails to appreciate the existence of this third effect and its direction, so their claim is not as 
general and policy-relevant as they think it is. 
There is a traditional and long-standing concern against intervening in the “free market,” whether for 
reasons of freedom, utility, or efficiency. Kaplow and Shavell’s double-distortion claim for using the 
income tax rather than legal rules to redistribute income is simply one of the more recent arguments in 
this enduring inclination. However, in confronting income inequality, we shouldn’t avoid using any tool 
available to address this important problem. My research suggests that legal rules can indeed be used to 
mitigate income inequality. 
 
